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I.

Introduction

The International Monetary Fund has undergone various changes in the past decades. One
notable change has been its increased use of conditionality, the practice whereby the Fund
attaches conditions to loans it makes available to member countries in financial distress. During
the 1990s the Fund has dramatically increased both the number of conditions and the degree to
which these conditions are related to the internal affairs of member countries. The increased use
of conditionality has attracted a great deal of criticism in recent years. In particular, it has been
argued that conditions infringe on the sovereignty of countries, that the Fund is exceeding its
jurisdiction, and that conditions have not been effective in inducing economic reform.
In this paper I attempt to deal with these criticisms by proposing a new mechanism for
designing conditions in loan agreements, and by arguing for the legalization and formalization of
the procedure for IMF lending in the light of concepts and ideas derived mainly from domestic
administrative laws.1
The gist of the proposal is that, rather than have the Fund determine the conditions in loan
agreements following informal negotiations with member countries, member countries will
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design the conditions themselves. Thus member countries will effectively choose to impose
conditions on themselves. The Fund will have the power to review these conditions pursuant to
specified grounds of review. If the conditions withstand these grounds of review, the Fund will
have to extend the loan on the conditions designed by the member country. If the conditions do
not withstand these grounds of review, the Fund will step in and propose its own conditions as
under the current system.
Section II of this paper deals with the criticisms of conditionality. I will show that there are
no easy solutions to the problems that conditionality raises. The main conclusion of this section
is that a balance has to be struck between the interests of the Fund and the interests of member
countries. In Section III, I set out the proposal for self-imposed conditionality, describing the
main features of the proposal and its main advantages in the light of the criticisms discussed in
Section II. I also discuss the content of the grounds of review and the application procedure.
Section IV deals in detail with potential problems that the proposal entails and possible solutions
to these problems. Finally, in Section V I will discuss the consequences of legalization and
formalization of conditionality and the implications that the proposal may have for the role of the
Fund.
It should be noted that this paper does not deal with many questions that concern the Fund’s
activity, such as, whether it makes sense to unify the Fund and the World Bank, whether it makes
sense to maintain the Fund at all given its current function as lender of last resort,2 or the moral
hazard problem.3 It also does not deal directly with more specific criticisms regarding the
composition of the Fund’s staff and the alleged control of the major shareholders over Fund
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resources.4 I do not challenge the Fund’s role as a lender of last resort to countries in financial
distress, which are exclusively developing countries in practice.5

II.

Increasing Criticism of IMF Conditionality

The manner in which the Fund has formulated conditions in loan agreements and the substance
of those conditions has been subject to fierce criticism. Recent financial crises, especially the
Southeast Asia Crisis and the crises in Russia and Argentina, have led the Fund to impose
stringent and expansive conditions in loan agreements, extending far beyond the traditional
ambit of the Fund’s powers. Conditions have increased both in number and in the degree of
intervention in the internal affairs of member countries.6 They have come not only to include
general macroeconomic factors, but to involve direct interference in issues, such as, for example,
tax rates, banking regulation and even prices of commodities. There has been a shift from pure
macroeconomic factors to microeconomic structural reforms. As pointed out by Lowenfeld,
‘…the boundary between international and internal concern seems to have largely disappeared.’7
It is important to discuss the main criticisms of conditionality, as they set the background for my
proposal.
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A. Excess of Jurisdiction
It is argued that the Fund has exceeded its jurisdiction, as conferred on it by the Articles of
Agreement. Critics of the Fund argue that the Fund does not have the power to require countries
to undergo substantial internal reform that may involve significant cultural and infrastructural
changes which lie beyond the ambit of the Fund’s authority, and that the Fund’s conditions
should essentially be limited to macroeconomic measures.8 On the other hand, others have tried
to defend a broader interpretation of the Fund’s jurisdiction. For example, Hockett seems to
argue that the words of the Articles of the Agreement give the Fund the scope to impose any
conditions it considers appropriate,9 and that member countries can simply refrain from
borrowing if they disagree with these conditions.10
Although this argument may be defensible on the basis of the wording of the Articles,
Hockett downplays the public character of the Fund and its duties toward the international
community. The Fund is not, as Hockett suggests, like any other creditor concerned with
repayment of its debt. The Fund is a public institution that has a duty to serve certain specified
public purposes,11 the underlying rationale of these purposes being the maintenance and
enhancement of international financial stability. Most importantly, the Fund has ‘To give
confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to
them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments
in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
8
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international prosperity.’12 Therefore, when the Fund exercises its powers it has a duty to act
within the proper scope of its authority as defined by the Articles of Agreement. Although loan
conditions are not subject to any process of judicial review, their legitimate scope should not be
defined solely on the basis of the Fund’s subjective judgment.
The problem is how to interpret the scope of the Fund’s jurisdiction, given its public
purposes and the need to safeguard its interests. As pointed out by Lowenfeld, it is not clear how
and where to draw the jurisdictional line in each case between matters which the Fund is entitled
to take into consideration and matters which the Fund should refrain from dealing with.13 For this
purpose, the distinction between macroeconomic and microeconomic structural conditions has
been shown to be unhelpful.14 One suggestion has been to frame the jurisdictional line in simple
terms, asking whether a proposed condition is truly necessary to restore the borrower country to
capital markets and enable it to repay its debts.15 But leading economists may diverge on the
question of what measures are actually necessary, and especially whether microeconomic
measures are required.16 In some instances, simple measures are sufficient, and in other
instances, more extensive and intrusive measures are necessary. Again, economists will diverge
on these issues and only ex post analysis of economic developments following the loan can
provide clearer answers.17
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B. Infringement of Sovereignty
A second interrelated argument concerns the sovereignty of member countries. Critics of the
Fund have argued that conditions in Fund loans infringe on the sovereignty of member
countries.18 As mentioned above, conditions have included, inter alia, detailed reform in various
fields, including corporate governance, banking regulation, tax reform, liberalization of trade,
eliminating ceilings on foreign investments, permitting foreign banks and companies to establish
subsidiaries and price controls, etc. These are all matters that are normally decided by the
government in each country. Article 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
expressly says: ‘Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic
system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its
people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.’19
Conditionality is said to infringe on sovereignty because it constrains the power of sovereign
governments to determine national policies. Feldstein, for example, says: ‘The legitimate
political institutions of the country should determine the nation’s economic structure and the
nature of its institutions. A nation’s desperate need for short term financial help does not give the
IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation’s
political process.’20 Similarly, Tsai says that conditionality handicaps the debtor nations’ ability
to develop their own solutions to economic disasters, and that they are forced to abandon the
course of economic development chosen prior to the crisis and to accept the vision for economic
development chosen by the IMF. The economic changes that are imposed are not temporary and
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are meant to last after the financial crisis has elapsed, in circumstances where there may be other,
alternative regulatory and economic choices.21 Although a country may well choose not to
borrow money from the Fund and thereby exercise its sovereignty,22 in many cases, where the
costs of not accepting conditionality are very high – especially the costs of default – there is no
real choice and countries may be compelled to accept the dictates of the Fund.23
On the other hand, conditionality has important legitimate purposes. As Hockett correctly
argues, ‘…it seems doubtful that the Fund could legitimately lend to troubled members without
imposing conditions reasonably calculated to ensuring monetary stabilization within their
jurisdictions…Irresponsible lending, “throwing good money after bad”, would be illegitimate
behavior on the part of the [Fund]…whose members supply the borrowed funds. Conditional
lending, therefore, is not only legitimate, but is affirmatively required.’24 Thus, although
conditions may infringe on some aspects of a country’s sovereignty, it is clear that responsible
lending requires the Fund to impose conditions when it lends money to countries in financial
crisis. Even some of the Fund’s most prominent critics argue that sometimes it does not intervene
enough. Stiglitz argues that the Fund should have required some countries to undergo land
reform.25 Likewise, Feldstein argues that the Fund should have required Argentina to undergo
significant tax reform.

26
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commitment to make certain changes to its policies. The problem is that countries, especially
small ones, may have very little leverage vis-à-vis the Fund in crisis situations, and they can
therefore be compelled to accept the Fund’s dictates. Recent reports of the Independent
Evaluation Office of the IMF (the ‘IEO’) confirm that although in some instances conditions
reflected national choices, the Fund did use its leverage to pursue long term policies that were
not critical to crisis resolution.28 Buira persuasively argues that the political strength of each
country has been a major factor in determining the extent to which the Fund is able to pressure
countries to accept its policies, and moreover, that conditions have too often reflected the
political interests of donor countries.29
The Fund is not unaware of the above criticisms. The most recent Guidelines on
Conditionality strongly emphasize the importance of countries’ ownership of their economic and
financial policies. The Guidelines expressly state that ‘ …the Fund will be guided by the
principle that the member has primary responsibility for the selection, design, and
implementation of its economic and financial policies.’30 Moreover, the Guidelines emphasize
that conditions must be critical to achieve the goals of Fund programs and should be limited to
the minimum necessary for this purpose.
Although some progress has been made, it is questionable whether these guidelines
materially change the balance of power between the Fund and member countries.31 Given that
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the negotiation process remains essentially informal and confidential, there are no effective
institutional means for ensuring that the Fund will follow its own guidelines and that its
intervention is, so far as possible, consistent with the political, social and economic aspirations of
member countries.32 The test for the ‘criticality’ of conditions under the new Guidelines remains
the product of an unreviewable, informal and confidential process and therefore does not provide
an adequate safeguard for countries’ sovereignty and ownership of policy.

C. One-Size-Fits-All: Should the Fund Pursue Economic and Legal
Convergence?
The Fund has been accused of applying the same prescriptions to every country, whatever the
problems encountered may be and irrespective of its social, economic and political
characteristics. Stiglitz, for example, has accused the Fund of imposing its ‘economic ideology’
of ‘market fundamentalism’ on developing countries.33 While Stiglitz’s accusation is very
debatable,34 there are strong indications that conditionality has suffered from a bias towards
particular policies.
For example, Feldstein argues that the Fund applied virtually identical prescriptions to
Russia, Korea and Thailand, even though these countries were undergoing essentially different
crises.35 Russia was a country emerging from a communist regime that needed structural
adjustments to a capitalist economy, whereas Thailand suffered from a large account deficit, and
Fund’s core areas of expertise. But, in many loans the number of conditions remains very high and the evidence on
the level of country ownership is inconsistent. In addition, it seems that conditions dropped from Fund loans are
being taken up in the World Bank programs. See also Eurodad, Streamlining of Structural Conditionality – What
Has Happened? (May 2003), at http://eurodad.org/uploadstore/cms/docs/Streamliningfinal.pdf (last visited 23
January 2005); Angela Wood, World Vision International, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Ownership, PRSPs
and
IFI
Conditionality
(2004),
at
http://www.globalpoverty.org/PolicyAdvocacy/pahome2.5.nsf/gereports/00D3C4F30C7E423E88256E7F000CB054/$file/One%20Ste
p%20Forward.pdf (last visited 23 January 2005). A major critique in these reports is that the Fund does not seriously
consider the policy alternatives proposed by developing countries.
32
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33
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Korea was undergoing temporary illiquidity. Nonetheless, they all had to follow similar
prescriptions, including: privatization, trade and capital market liberalization, conditions
facilitating foreign direct investment, corporate laws facilitating hostile takeovers, conditions
requiring more central bank independence and general austerity measures, such as higher tax
rates, less government spending and higher interest rates. Likewise, a recent IEO report suggests
that Fund policies are sometimes tainted by contractionary bias and tend to overestimate the
beneficial effects of austerity measures.36
Apart from concerns regarding the appropriateness of the Fund’s measures, these standard
prescriptions raise the question of the extent to which countries share, or should share, a unified
understanding of good economic policy-making and regulatory approaches. Although there may
be benefits to a convergence of understandings,37 we have yet to reach such a state of affairs,
even if we consider exclusively countries with western, capitalist and democratic backgrounds.
First, despite unanimity as to certain basic principles, economists diverge substantially as to the
required measures for economic recovery. One clear example concerns inflation rates. Whereas
some economists consider the reduction of inflation as a necessary step towards economic
recovery, others maintain that a temporarily high inflation rate may be conducive to recovery
because it encourages growth and prevents unemployment. Similar disagreements pertain to
other measures, such as the reduction of budget deficit and government spending, foreign direct
investment, and trade and capital market liberalization. Although all economists agree that these
are generally desirable measures, there is ample disagreement with regard to issues such as
timing, sequencing, prioritizing, and the degree to which these measures should be pursued.

36
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Second, even within the prosperous economies there are significant divergences in approach
towards issues such as privatization, corporate governance, banking regulation, etc. For example,
the role of government in promoting social welfare in some countries, such as Sweden, is
substantially larger than in other Western countries, such as the United States. The level of
independence of central banks in different countries varies, and their goals may be defined
differently.38 In some countries corporate laws facilitate hostile takeovers while in other
countries they are generally discouraged. Whether Anglo-American models – however
efficiently they may work in some countries – are suitable for developing countries is an issue far
from being resolved,39 and the relevance of culture and path dependence to designing efficient
solutions has not been fully explored. Therefore, it does not make sense to allow the Fund to
impose its own views, when there are other legitimate alternative forms of regulatory framework.
Several observations can be made at this stage. First, there are some elementary economic
‘truths’ upon which all nations seem to agree. For example, all agree that long-term high
inflation is inefficient. Second, for many economic and regulatory issues, there is a range of
legitimate and reasonable structures. For example, a country may temporarily limit foreign direct
investment because domestic actors need to be strengthened before they can sustain competition
with foreign actors; the government can decide to maintain some short-term inflation to prevent
excessive unemployment; corporate laws may require mandatory tender offers in takeover
situations, etc.
Accordingly, when conditions are being designed, there may be several options that fall
within the range of reasonable economic policies. All of these reasonable policies are in principle
ex ante adequate to meet the Fund’s broad objectives of ensuring that the borrower country
38

For example, legislation can limit the discretion of the central bank to achieving price stability, but it may also
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repays its debt, maintaining stability in international capital markets, and helping the country
return to capital markets. But within this range of reasonableness, countries should be left to
make their choice of policy in accordance with their own cultural, political and economic
aspirations.
It is possible, in theory, that with an already growing convergence of economic factors and
economic standards, the range of reasonableness in economic policy-making will become
narrower to the extent that there will be only one economic solution to each problem. But such
convergence must be reached through a process of deliberation, experimentation and
participation of all stakeholders in the process – not through conditions imposed in loans to
countries in financial crisis.

D. The IMF’s Prescriptions Have Been Ineffective
In many instances, the Fund’s prescriptions have been ineffective in restoring confidence and
financial stability. One of the main consequences of the ineffectiveness of conditions is that
countries have repeatedly failed to recover from ongoing financial distress and continue to seek
Fund assistance over a prolonged period. Although this failure is attributable in large part to the
countries’ policies and external economic conditions, there is nevertheless considerable evidence
of misguided policies in the Fund’s prescriptions. The IEO reports criticize the Fund for several
failures, including: failure to address vulnerabilities in countries’ economies; failure to take into
account the political feasibility of Fund programs and implementation capacity constraints; overoptimistic assessments of the effects of conditionality; inadequate prioritization; insufficient
focus on key structural issues, leading to confusion in implementation and distraction from
critical reforms; and insufficient attention to social concerns and the need for adequate safety
nets.40
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In some instances, it appears that conditions actually aggravated the financial situation.
Conditions requiring member countries to privatize state-owned enterprises before they had
effective competition laws led to the creation of predatory private monopolies.41 Similarly, in
some societies the lack of safety nets to assist domestic workers who might lose their jobs
following privatization or policies of cutting-off food subsidies were a source of acute social and
political unrest.42 Moreover, trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, albeit beneficial
in principle, may cause severe unemployment when prematurely imposed on developing
countries.43
Concerns have been raised about the Fund’s insufficient expertise in two main respects. First,
the Fund is somewhat limited in its capacity to understand the complex social and political
circumstances of member countries.44 Domestic experts with lifelong familiarity with local
politics, conditions and trends may be better informed than the Fund’s staff in this respect.45
Second, structural conditionality has focused on several areas which lie significantly beyond the
Fund’s main expertise in monetary and fiscal issues. For example, between 1996 and 1999 about
two-thirds of the structural policy conditions involved financial-sector policies, tax and
expenditure reforms, public enterprises and privatizations.46
But again the problem is more complicated. First, some of the Fund’s prescriptions have been
very successful and, when adequately followed, yielded desirable results. For example, the
austerity package which Mexico committed to implement in 1995 has proved extremely
successful, and Mexico was able to pay its debt to the Fund even before it became due.47 Second,
in many instances the Fund may be better placed than domestic governments to pinpoint
inefficiencies in the domestic economy, partly because of its professionalism and expertise, and
41

Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 57; Goldstein, above footnote 6, at 55.
Stiglitz, above footnote 8, at 57,119-120.
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Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 590.
42
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partly because in many cases a third-party observer may be a better judge and critic of a stagnant
and inefficient system. It must be remembered that not infrequently domestic governments
significantly contribute to, or even precipitate, a financial crisis.

E. Conditionality is a Poor Incentive for Economic Reform
Many studies have concluded that conditionality in loan agreements is a poor incentive for
inducing economic reform. Conditionality fails to create an incentive system sufficient to induce
governments to implement policies they would not otherwise undertake, or would undertake
more gradually.48 The IEO has consistently stressed the importance of ownership to effective
implementation and economic recovery.49 Thus, the best results have been achieved in
circumstances where the member country was committed to implementing Fund policies. For
example, Korea implemented a set of far-reaching structural reforms50 largely because these
reforms enjoyed strong political commitment. The worse results have been obtained in countries,
as Indonesia, where program ownership was weak.51 A country which resists a specific reform is
unlikely to implement it effectively and promptly.52 More strikingly, a recent report of the IEO
expressly states:
When action in areas that are not macro-critical is nevertheless deemed to be important, a
“second-best” policy package that is strongly owned may be more likely to help restore
48

Tony Killick, Ramani Gunalatika & Ana Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change (London
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49
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See IEO (2003a), above footnote 28; Statement by Montek S. Ahluwalia, Director, Independent Evaluation Office
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confidence than a “first-best” package that is painfully negotiated and over which there are
substantial domestic reservations.53

In addition, there is strong evidence that the rates of compliance with conditions have fallen
sharply as the Fund increased the number and breadth of loan conditions, especially those
concerning structural reform.54 One of the main reasons for this is that the increase in the number
of non-critical structural conditions has distracted attention and focus from those which are vital
to economic recovery. Moreover, the more structural conditions there are, and the more detailed
they are, the less likely it becomes that they will be owned by governments and enjoy domestic
political support.
As discussed above, the recent Guidelines on Conditionality are designed to address some of
these problems; but again, they seem to have brought only modest changes, and there is no
institutional means to monitor and review their application.

F. Lack of Accountability and Transparency
The increase in the effect of conditionality on the economies and political structure of developing
countries calls for greater accountability of the Fund to its stakeholders and the public at large,
and for better transparency of its decision-making processes. As Stewart says, as the intensity of
regulatory authority by international regime continues to grow, there is a need for an effective
legal institutional mechanism of accountability and transparency.55 Several problems with
conditionality are particularly pertinent.
First, the Fund is insufficiently accountable to developing countries. The day-to-day work of
the Fund is overseen by its Executive Board. However, developing countries have no effective
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representation on the Board and it is dominated by the major shareholders.56 Moreover, the
Fund’s staff exerts substantial control over the Fund’s policies and the Board’s supervision is
weak.57 The major shareholders have substantial influence over the staff’s decision-making via
informal avenues, and decisions have often been taken without consulting the Executive Board.
Second, the review process of the Fund’s decisions is conducted by the Fund itself via
various internal and external evaluations. The internal evaluations are confidential, but the
external evaluations are generally published.58 Until recently, external reviews have had little
influence and few ex post assessments were undertaken by the Fund.59 With the establishment of
the IEO in 2002, external evaluations are expected to gain more importance, and they have
already been helpful in improving the Fund’s operations. However, their effectiveness in
inducing follow-up changes is limited because they are not required to be taken into account in
the Fund’s daily operations, and because there is no institutional mechanism for supervising and
monitoring proposed reforms. The IEO itself stresses the importance of systematic ex post
reviews and the study of past cases for the effectiveness of Fund programs.60
Finally, the Fund’s decision-making process suffers from a lack of transparency. Several
defects have been identified by the IEO. There is often uncertainty regarding the reasons for
particular decisions and the facts on which they are based. For example, a recent IEO report on
Argentina states: ‘There was also a lack of clarity as to why a particular decision was made. The
absence of clear rules led to excessive reliance on discretion, which in turn created an
56
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environment of great uncertainty and unpredictability as to what the IMF would do next and
encouraged the Argentine authorities to pursue questionable measures in an attempt to gamble
for redemption.’61 The rationale for the Fund’s decisions is not brought out in the Fund’s
documents, and there is insufficient explanation of proposed policies and the assumptions that
underlie them.62 There is also great uncertainty regarding the extent to which political
considerations and interests affect the Fund’s decision-making and their interaction with
technical judgment.63

G. Intermediate Conclusion
It is useful to summarize the above observations before setting out my proposal for self-imposed
conditionality. First, it is virtually impossible to rely solely on a formal distinction to define the
extent to which conditionality can interfere with a country’s internal affairs. Distinctions
between microeconomic and macroeconomic criteria, or between internal or international
criteria, are not practical for the reasons specified above. Moreover, what is necessary to solve
economic crises is a subject of substantial disagreement.
Second, there is at least some trade-off between conditionality and sovereignty. Countries
that approach the Fund must recognize that they will have to cede some sovereignty and control
over domestic policy-making in exchange for the Fund’s assistance. However, the Fund should
not impose conditions beyond what is warranted to achieve the goals of Fund programs.
Third, in many instances of financial crisis there may be a range of reasonable effective
solutions to which different economists may subscribe. Member countries should be able to
make their policy choices within this range of possible solutions. A mechanism which allows
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member countries to make these choices would enable countries to exercise maximum
sovereignty without compromising the legitimate interests and concerns of the Fund.
Fourth, the Fund has no comparative advantage vis-à-vis developing countries in respect of
certain issues, especially those that require a profound understanding of the cultural, social and
political circumstances of the country. Conditions must take account of such circumstances in
order to maximize the chances for their full implementation and for the country’s economic
recovery. Thus, more should be done to increase the participation of domestic experts and
officials with relevant knowledge and information in designing Fund programs.
Fifth, there is a need for a better incentive system to get countries to adopt and implement
reform policies. The ‘ownership’ concept embedded in ‘soft’ guidelines is insufficient without a
meaningful, albeit imperfect, formal mechanism to induce countries to initiate reform proposals.
Finally, the development of conditionality, in particular its increasing effect and seemingly
decreasing effectiveness, poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Fund. There is a pressing
need for more transparency and a better accountability mechanism.

III.

A Proposal for Self-Imposed Conditionality
A. Outline of Self-Imposed Conditionality
At the heart of the proposal I set out below lies the need for a mechanism that gives greater

weight to the economic sovereignty of member countries. Member countries should be able to
choose from among a range of reasonable economic policies those that are most consistent with
their national aspirations and traditions. The thrust of the proposal is procedural reform. Because
the jurisdictional lines of the Fund’s authority are too difficult to draw and there is no review
mechanism to ensure that the Fund does not exceed its jurisdiction, it is better to formulate a
procedure that allows member countries a greater say in designing the conditions.
Accordingly, countries that apply to the Fund for a loan should be able to determine the type
of conditions that that country is committed to implementing. The country will make a
20

submission to the Fund detailing the conditions it proposes to include in the loan agreement,
including the reasons and facts on which the proposal is based. Countries will thus have a right
of ‘first proposal’ and the opportunity to impose conditions on themselves.
The Fund will have the power to review the submission made by the country, but it will have
to accept that submission and make the loan on the proposed conditions unless they fail to
comply with certain specified grounds of review. The Fund will conduct a swift procedure under
which it will determine whether the proposed conditions are consistent with specific standards.
The main ground of review is reasonableness. Conditions proposed by member countries have to
meet the standard of reasonableness. Countries will also have to satisfy certain procedural
requirements: they will have to make adequate disclosure of the facts that form the basis for their
policy proposals; they will have to state the reasons for the suggested conditions; and they may
have to make specific consultations.64 If the Fund decides that the proposed conditions fail to
satisfy one of the grounds of review, then it can step in and propose its own conditions.65
The Fund has to give reasons for its decisions and explain why they withstand or fail to
withstand the standard of reasonableness. The reasons should include references to past cases of
conditionality as well as ex post reviews conducted by the Fund (and also, presumably, by the
IEO). The submissions made to the Fund, the Fund’s decisions and the reasons for the decisions
will be published. Thus, instead of a confidential process, the Fund’s decisions will be open and
susceptible to public and academic scrutiny.66
Additionally, the Fund will have to provide countries with technical assistance as well as
allow countries to use its resources and information data-base when making submissions.
Finally, member countries will be able to waive their right to design the conditions in
circumstances where it would be impractical for them to make a submission.
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The nature and extent of these grounds of review are discussed below.
Of course, the country applying to the Fund can always decide not to use the Fund’s resources or try to further
negotiate with the Fund over the content of the conditions.
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B. Advantages of the Proposal over the Current System
The proposal for self-imposed conditionality has several advantages over the current practice
of conditionality, many of which address the specific criticisms raised above.

1. Economic Sovereignty
The proposal creates a new balance between the sovereignty of member countries and the Fund’s
power to intervene in a country’s internal affairs. The suggested process ensures that countries
have the opportunity to design conditions as they consider best for emerging out of financial
crises and regaining their credibility in financial markets. It ensures that if there are several
reasonable and legitimate economic steps that can be taken to address the crisis, the affected
country can choose the one that is consistent with its national aspirations and traditions. Subject
to the Fund’s review powers, countries also have a choice with regard to the scope of the
proposed conditions. Conditions can equally include an extensive range of economic activities
and reforms or minimal steps that concern only a narrow range of issues.67 Accordingly, the
proposal reflects the value of ownership as expressed in the Guidelines on Conditionality and
gives it a formal underpinning.

2. Economic Plurality and Increased Participation
Subject to the Fund’s review powers, the proposal assumes that different countries may choose
to adopt different economic policies, even if the problems in those countries are similar in nature.
The Fund will have to consider the countries’ preferences of economic choices and will not be
able to deny assistance merely on the basis of having different preferences. The Fund will review
the countries’ submissions and determine whether they are reasonable. Naturally, other countries
will get some idea of how the grounds of review are applied. They can criticize the process,
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demanding more respect for their autonomy, or alternatively they may seek to improve their
arguments to the Fund or distinguish their case from those of other countries.
The openness of the new procedure will create a deliberative process between the Fund and
member countries based on emerging case-studies. This deliberative process will enhance mutual
study of the economies of different countries and regions, of the feasibility of different economic
solutions to commonly shared problems, and of the economic measures necessary in crisis
situations. At present, deliberation and cross-learning are not strong, in the absence of accessible
and regularized ex post review of Fund programs and the lack of a consistent record of
submissions, negotiations and internal documents explaining the rationale of Fund programs. A
deliberative process will also enhance the legitimacy of conditionality because of the increased
participation of developing countries in designing and shaping the practice of conditionality.
Thus developing countries will have an avenue of participation in the process of increasing
global welfare and the study of economics, while the Fund’s authority will be given a new source
of legitimacy.

3. More Effective Prescriptions

The proposal is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of conditionality in two material respects.
First, it mitigates the problem of the Fund’s imperfect knowledge of countries’ internal affairs.
Governments that make submissions to the Fund may have a better knowledge of the nature of
domestic political, economic and social problems and the political feasibility of potential
economic reforms than the Fund’s staff.68 The proposal ensures that governments have the
opportunity to present their solution in a formal and transparent manner. Of course, the external
expertise of the Fund may be vital to inducing critical reforms, but the Fund’s expertise will be
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given effect when it reviews countries’ submissions. Second, the effectiveness of program design
will also be enhanced by the gradual emergence of standards generated by the application of
reasonableness and the extended scope for ex post review. From one case to another, it is
expected that reasonableness review will develop into a more concrete and detailed range of
standards pertaining to specific economic issues and situations. Such standards will guide
countries that make submissions to the Fund and, more importantly, countries that wish to avoid
financial instability. Third, ex post review of Fund programs is likely to be more effective than in
the current system because of the availability of better records of countries’ submissions, the
Fund’s decisions and the reasons and facts that underlie them. The Fund will also use such
reviews and all relevant records in justifying and explaining the rationale for its decisions. A
more reasoned decision-making process based on past cases and results will improve the quality
of program design.
4. Better Prospects for Reform
As discussed above, owned policies have better chances of being implemented than externallyimposed policies. Policies submitted by governments without the Fund’s direct intervention are
likely to enjoy a higher level of ownership. Thus, the rates of compliance with Fund conditions
are likely to increase. In addition, countries will have greater incentive than in the current system
to engage in economic reform. Governments have an inherent incentive to maintain control over
their economic policies. In order to do this, they would have to submit to the Fund a reasonable
program. Thus, a government that wishes to retain control over the reform process will have an
incentive to formulate reasonable programs that address the relevant issues that require reform.
Understanding that they will have to commit to certain conditions anyway, governments may
prefer to design the conditions themselves rather than let the Fund intervene in their affairs.69
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5. Greater Incentive to Disclose Information
The governments’ interest in retaining control over the substance of proposed reform will also
provide incentives to countries to disclose information to the Fund about economic conditions in
these countries. The Fund will need sufficient information in order to be convinced of the
reasonableness of the proposal. Countries making submissions to the Fund will have to provide
the Fund with sufficient information to enable the Fund to review the proposal. For example, if a
country proposes a change to its banking regulation, then the government will have to provide
the Fund with information regarding the deficiencies in current regulation and why the
government expects the proposed changes to solve the problems. Accordingly, countries are
likely to release more information on their economic and regulatory frameworks.

6. Transparency and Accountability
The proposal improves the transparency and accountability of the Fund’s decision-making
process. Submissions made by member countries and the Fund’s decisions, including the reasons
for these decisions, will be published.
Transparency will no doubt facilitate and encourage criticism of the Fund’s operation by all
stakeholders involved in the process. Thus it is likely to enhance the accountability of the Fund
to member countries, their citizens, and the public at large. The flow of information that the
process will generate will be used by academics, practitioners, NGOs and civil society to assess
the Fund’s role. This process will also be aided by the increased use and effectiveness of ex post
reviews of the Fund’s operations – whether by the IEO, academics, or the Fund itself. Such
reviews will further help in assessing the Fund’s operations by professionals and laymen alike.
Although there will be no judicial review mechanism of the Fund’s decisions, the Fund is very
conscious of its pubic image, and failure to follow due process or bad decision-making is likely
to lead to external pressure on the Fund to change its course.
25

Transparency is also a powerful tool in building the credibility of conditionality. The IEO
stresses the importance of communicating the logic of program design to the market and
disclosing all relevant information both by the Fund and member countries. It specifically
recommends the publication of staff reports supporting the countries’ requests for use of Fund
resources, i.e., the reasons and justifications for the program. Such publication will help achieve
broader domestic support and stronger ownership of program design during a crisis, as well as
restore market confidence.70
In addition, the credibility of program design will be strengthened because the political
influence of major shareholders within a transparent procedure will be limited. 71 The Fund will
have to base its decisions on technical assessments of risks and trade-offs and its reasoning will
be published. Although political considerations inevitably affect the process and the opinions of
Board members, their influence will be constrained by the requirement to explain decisions by
reference to specific standards.
Better transparency and accountability will increase the legitimacy of the conditionality
process. Where the conditions proposed by the applying country withstand the Fund’s review,
they will clearly be perceived as legitimate, assuming the Fund is not too lenient in exercising its
review. Where the Fund insists on its own conditions, the furnishing of reasons for its decision in
accordance with specific standards and lessons learned from past cases will legitimate the Fund’s
intervention.

70

IEO (2003a), above footnote 28, at 43-44, 50-51: ‘In this effort of building credibility, transparency is a useful
tool. In a capital account crisis, the IMF does not necessarily have more information than the private sector. Without
disclosure of critical information for the investors, for example concerning the financing assumptions, or how
policies might be adjusted to evolving developments, it is difficult to expect the markets to perceive the program to
be credible.’
71
See IEO (2002), above footnote 28, at 15-16: ‘The appearance of undue political intervention in the IMF’s
decisions to grant a country access to its resources undermines the credibility of programs. Procedures should be
evolved so that political considerations, which are inevitably present in these decisions, are seen to be taken into
account in a transparent manner, with decisions and accountability clearly at the level of the Executive Board on the
basis of a candid technical assessment by staff of the risk and potential trade-offs.’
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C. The Fund’s Review Powers - the Grounds of Review
Reform of conditionality depends in large part on the content of the suggested grounds of review
and on the manner in which the Fund would exercise them. The underlying rationale for these
grounds of review and their exercise is twofold: on the one hand, they ought to ensure adequate
respect for countries’ economic sovereignty and economic plurality; and on the other hand, they
ought to ensure responsible lending and that the Fund is repaid its debt.
The suggested grounds of review are largely modeled on the typical grounds of review that
exist in domestic administrative laws. Although there is no clear-cut distinction between
procedural and substantive grounds of review, it is useful for the purpose of exposition to deal
with them separately.

1. Procedural Grounds of Review
Procedural grounds of review are designed to ensure that decisions are made in an informed and
reasoned manner. They are of great importance because of the inevitable uncertainty of
substantive review of economic decision-making, and because they induce good policy-making
and reduce the need for scrutinizing the substance of the proposed conditions. On the other hand,
if the procedural requirements are too stringent and restrictive, they may lead to undue delays
and administrative costs.
a. Disclosure and sufficient factual basis: Submissions to the Fund must be supported by
relevant and accurate facts to enable the country to make an informed policy choice. For
example, if the country proposes to make a cut in its budget, it will have to specify how this will
be done, what kind of expenses are going to be reduced, and, where relevant, how the country
will deal with these cuts, e.g., through increased efficiency and savings. The member country
will also have to disclose relevant facts concerning its economy. Following the above example, it
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will have to disclose relevant figures regarding its budget in former years and why it considers
the former budget plan to have been unsuccessful.
b. All relevant considerations must be taken into account: A country must give at least some
weight to all relevant considerations. This is a standard ground of review in administrative law.
The more difficult question concerns the weight that a country ought to give to each relevant
consideration under the standard of reasonableness.
c. Reasons: A submission to the Fund must specify the reasons for the suggested conditions.
The country will therefore have to justify its policy choices. It is important to emphasize again
that the submission, including the reasons that underlie it, will be published.72 Thus they will
form not only the basis for the Fund’s substantive review of the submission, but also the basis for
public, political and academic scrutiny of its content. Where the Fund does not accept the
proposal, these reasons may be highly important in assessing the wisdom of the conditions which
the Fund will later determine. Additionally, the Fund may pay regard to these reasons when
formulating its own conditions even if it does not approve the country’s proposed conditions perhaps because they may direct the Fund to a new issue that it would otherwise not consider.
d. Consultations: Presumably, reasonable proposals will be prepared by professional
economists of sufficient experience and education. In fact, member countries increasingly
engage investment banks when dealing with the Fund. It is questionable, though, whether there
should be a formal requirement to consult with qualified economists. If a submission is
reasonable, then arguably it should not matter whether or not it was prepared in consultation with
economists of sufficient pedigree. Nonetheless, there is merit in requiring each submission to be
accompanied by a report or recommendation by economists that support the proposed conditions,
including a formal certification that they consider the proposed conditions to be reasonable.73
The main benefit of such a requirement is that it lends more force to the country’s proposal. It
72
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will be more difficult for the Fund to claim that a proposal is unreasonable when qualified
economists express a different view. It increases the chances that countries will meet the grounds
of review, because such economists would speak the same language as the Fund and be better
able to preempt its response.
There are, however, several difficulties with such a requirement. For example, some
countries may not be able to afford prominent economists. More importantly, the question arises
as to which economists should serve this role and whose interests they should represent. The
answer must start with a specification of professional requirements. Thus, economists must have
certain relevant education and experience in economics. Naturally, this requirement will be
supervised by the Fund. But it must be ensured that economists from developing countries
educated in those countries are given a fair chance to meet the professional criteria, and they
need not enjoy international acclaim and reputation.74
Second, the Fund may maintain a pool of economists that specialize in macro-economic
issues, especially emerging markets and developing countries. The question then will be, who
will appoint these economists?75 As stated above, sometimes domestic understanding of internal
problems is essential for their resolution, and sometimes external intervention is necessary to
bring about a shift in policy because domestic actors are reluctant to make desirable changes that
militate against traditional norms. To give expression to both internal expertise and external
scrutiny, such economists should include largely two groups: economists appointed by
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developing countries76 and economists appointed by the Fund.77 The question then would be,
what is the right ratio between Fund economists and economists appointed by developing
countries? I leave this question open for future discussion, as it is not fundamental to the
proposal.78
Finally, it should be noted that if a process of making submissions and consultations is
formalized and institutionalized, there will be greater incentive and demand for economists to
engage in economic issues that concern developing countries. Moreover, developing countries
will have an incentive to train more economists for this specific role in order to maintain their
control over their economic policy-making. Alternatively, countries with sufficient means may
continue to engage large investment banks and law firms in drafting submissions and negotiating
with the Fund.79

2. Substantive Grounds of Review - Reasonableness
The main ground of review is the standard of reasonableness. Member countries must propose
conditions which are reasonable to achieve their aim. The traditional standard of reasonableness
seeks to strike down only decisions which no reasonable authority would consider reasonable.
Thus, in traditional administrative law the standard of reasonableness is designed to intercept

76

It is not essential for present purposes to decide how exactly this would be done. For example, the government
may appoint economists when it approaches the Fund, or alternatively it may appoint them to the pool in advance
and use their services when seeking the Fund’s assistance.
77
It may be argued that the Fund’s review powers over the substance of proposed conditions are sufficient for the
purpose of giving expression to external viewpoints. On this view, there should be no need for countries to consult
appointees of the Fund. Member countries will enjoy the advantage of feeling as free as possible to formulate any
policy they consider best without any external influence. On the other hand, consultation with the Fund may be
important in the early stage. The Fund’s appointees can raise various concerns that the Fund may have with regard
to suggested conditions; they can help the domestic team understand the Fund’s requirements; and they can be
responsible for maintaining informal channels to the Fund. It is important to emphasize that the Fund’s appointees
will be employed by the country and owe duties of care, diligence and confidentiality to the country rather than the
Fund.
78
My intuition, though, is that an appropriate ratio is 2:1 in favor of economists appointed by developing countries.
The reason for this is that the Fund’s economists will have an opportunity to make their impact anyway in reviewing
the country’s proposal.
79
That some countries can afford to engage large investment banks when dealing with the Fund raises concerns
about equality. Arguably, countries with insufficient means to engage prominent institutions will receive less
deferential treatment by the Fund. The idea of maintaining a pool of economists appointed by developing countries,
whose employment is subsidized by the Fund, is likely to solve this problem.
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only decisions that are so egregious as to amount to illegal acts. The underlying principle is that
the reviewing body does not seek to substitute for the judgment of the decision-maker.80
This proposal advocates a different and wider form of reasonableness review. The Fund
should be able to substitute for the judgment of the applying country to a larger extent than is
permitted pursuant to traditional notions of administrative law. The reason for this is simple.
There is hardly any question concerning the legality of economic policy-making. Rather, the
Fund has a duty to ensure the sufficiency of the steps undertaken by the countries that seek its
assistance. The crucial issue therefore is whether the proposed conditions are substantively
justified and whether they are likely to achieve the aims for which they were formulated. In other
words, the Fund will examine whether the country’s proposal gives due weight to all relevant
considerations, and not merely whether it is egregious.
The reasonableness standard begs the question of reasonable as to what, or in other words,
what are the aims of conditionality? The new Guidelines on Conditionality define the aims of
Fund programs as primarily (1) solving members’ balance of payment problems and (2)
achieving medium-term external viability while fostering sustainable growth.81 Presumably,
these aims will continue to apply. In any case, whatever formal definition of the aims of
conditionality is adopted, it is extremely important that these aims be clearly defined and that
80
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accordance with the terms and aims of each facility.
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reasonableness always be applied by reference to these aims.82 Otherwise, the process of
explaining decisions and applying reasonableness will become arbitrary and unprincipled.
There may be some degree of skepticism with regard to the practicality of substantive review
of economic decision-making. Two main concerns merit discussion. First, in domestic systems
there is ample criticism of the opaqueness and uncertainty of the reasonableness test.83 For
example, it is often argued that reasonableness review conceals the level of judges’ intervention
in the substance of administrative decision-making and the grounds for such intervention.
However, most of the criticisms of reasonableness review have to be understood against the
function of judicial review, which is to review the legality rather than the wisdom of
administrative actions. By contrast, the suggested reasonableness review is not amenable to such
criticisms because it expressly allows the Fund to consider the substance of the proposed
conditions and the weight countries give to each relevant consideration. Unlike the traditional
administrative law standard, reasonableness, in this context, is largely identical with its common
meaning rather than its ‘legal’ meaning.
Nonetheless, there would still be considerable scope for uncertainty because it cannot always
be clear whether a proposal is reasonable to achieve its aims. In addition, the same jurisdictional
uncertainly regarding the scope of the Fund’s authority and the risk of ‘mission creep’ will
persist as under the present system. The difficult questions concerning what is necessary to
reduce vulnerability or foster growth, and what structural measures are critical, will remain.
But, although these difficult questions will no doubt persist, the proposal for self-imposed
conditionality offers a more effective way of clarifying and elucidating the answers to them. The
understandings – of what counts and what does not count as reasonable for restoring viability
and fostering growth in certain circumstances – are likely to emerge out of a growing body of
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case-studies and precedents. The Fund will not be bound by previous determinations, but it will
have to use past cases and ex post reviews to justify its decisions when reviewing proposed
conditions. These precedents will be constantly published and reviewed by laymen and
professionals alike, and will thereby contribute to shared learning of economic issues as well as
improve the consistency of Fund decisions. Similar to the way that case-law develops into a
coherent body of rules, the Fund and member countries will learn by trial and error what
constitutes a reasonable economic policy in circumstances of financial distress.
In addition, other means can be adopted to counteract potential uncertainties. The Fund can
be required to take into account specified considerations in assessing the reasonableness of
proposed conditions, such as the benefits and costs of the proposal, critical vulnerabilities of the
domestic economy, the probability and political feasibility of implementation, risks and
uncertainties, possible alternative measures, distributional effects, etc. Another possible
consideration would be whether the proposed conditions themselves are consistent with various
international standards.84 It may also be helpful for the Fund to formulate some kind of
guidelines as to what it is likely to consider reasonable, preferably by reference to specific
precedents. These guidelines may add some certainty to the procedure, but it is important to keep
them very flexible in order to leave space for member countries to make their own contribution
to the process. Finally, the practical content of the reasonableness standard will be
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complemented by the Fund’s surveillance role, under which it already provides economic advice
to countries.85
The second concern is that the concept of ‘reasonableness review’ of economic policymaking is rather novel and arguably workable. Several examples may be helpful to demonstrate
the viability and potential of policy review. First, there are domestic agencies that are involved in
the review of policy-making, for example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an
agency of the President of the United States. The OMB’s function is to review cost-benefit
analyses of proposed regulation prepared by every regulatory agency in accordance with the
Presidential Orders.86 Its role is to discipline regulatory decision-making and eliminate
unjustified regulation through cost-benefit analysis and centralized review, i.e., it essentially
regulates other regulators.87 As pointed out by Stewart, although the OMB regulatory analysis
was initially controversial, it has become widely accepted by all administrations, Republican as
well as Democrat, and has become an integral part of US administrative law.88
The OMB is not a perfect analogy,89 but it bears several similarities to my proposal. First,
OMB review involves review of the substance of policy-making by economists and lawyers. In
fact, it is more controversial than the idea of Fund review, because the OMB has to deal with
regulation in various fields of which it has very little knowledge. The Fund’s economists, on the
other hand, have significant expertise in reviewing economic policy-making and making
reasoned judgments on the relevant strengths and weaknesses of economic policies. In addition,
like the Fund, OMB decisions are not subject to judicial review, and its function is designed to
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improve decision-making rather than create rights and benefits enforceable by any person.90
Accordingly, the integration and centrality of OMB review in the US regulatory process suggests
that the Fund’s review of proposed policies may be a successful mechanism that will help
improve economic policy-making in developing countries.
Second, the allocation of power over policy-making under my proposal is analogous to the
manner in which the European Community (EC) formulates and administers the implementation
of directives. Directives are legislative measures binding on member states as to the result to be
achieved.91 They determine certain targets, usually relating to various economic and regulatory
matters. National authorities reserve, however, the right to choose the form and method of
implementing these targets. Both the EC Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
perform actions, which are similar to the Fund’s review under my proposal. Both effectively
consider whether countries’ policies are reasonable for achieving a target specified in the
directives. The EC Commission has to make a determination as to whether a member state has
satisfied the requirements of the directives when it considers whether to bring proceedings
against a member state.92 The ECJ has to make the same determination in cases of alleged
infringements of a directive.93 Although EC directives are not a perfect analogy to the Fund’s
review because they serve different purposes,94 they do support the argument that reviewing
economic and regulatory policies can be an effective procedure.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the extent to which the Fund should take into account
interests and considerations that do not directly concern the economy of the applying country.
Possibly, the Fund should consider the interests of other member countries and international
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financial markets. An important consideration is whether the proposed policy is likely to
endanger or injure another economy. For example, a major devaluation of the currency in one
country may affect other economies. Another issue may be the consistency of proposed policies
with the countries’ international obligations pursuant to other international systems. For
example, a policy is unreasonable if it includes an increase in tariffs contrary to binding WTO
rules. Also, the Fund should possibly be able to take into account the environmental effects of
economic policy-making or even the human-rights record of member countries where relevant.

D. The Procedure for Applying to the Fund
The procedure for applying to the Fund is significant for the efficiency of the application
mechanism. There is no need to describe it in detail for the purposes of this paper, but some
critical issues that the application procedure must address should be highlighted.
First, the procedure for application by written submissions and review by the Fund has to be
expeditious, especially in emergency situations where the need for money is acute. Emphasis
must be placed on a swift, organized procedure with a focus on a speedy review mechanism and
strict deadlines. Parts of the submissions probably should be communicated to the Fund as they
are formulated, and the Fund should be able to give some informal indications as to the
reasonableness of proposed measures. Maintaining informal channels between countries and the
Fund can facilitate agreement and prevent clashes. The Fund will also have a duty to provide
technical assistance to countries and access to its information data-base.
Second, a decision need be taken in regard to what exactly member countries will have to
submit. Several items or preparatory work need be considered, for example: does a country have
to submit alternatives for its proposed conditions, explaining why they are less beneficial? Does
it have to submit a full cost-benefit analysis? Would it have to point out potential difficulties of
36

its proposal? Does it have to verify each of the figures that it supplies to the Fund, and in what
way? As said above, account has to be taken of the need for expediency. It may be better to leave
these issues to the discretion of the Fund. They can be considered by the Fund when exercising
its review powers. By applying the standard of reasonableness, the Fund could develop these
procedural requirements incrementally on the basis of precedents. In some instances limited
information may be sufficient, and in others when time is less pressing the Fund can demand
more explanations.
Third, the question arises as to who bears the burden of satisfying the grounds of review: the
Fund or the country applying to the Fund? The countries will have to bear this burden for all
practical purposes, as the Fund cannot be compelled to give away money unless it is persuaded
that the proposed conditions are reasonable. The main sanction against the Fund, if it uses
reasonableness too strictly or fails to give adequate reasons for its decisions, is public censure
and public pressure to change its conduct. It may be possible to initiate an independent review
mechanism by an advisory committee that will adjudicate disputes between the Fund and
member countries. But such a procedure may lead to over-formalization, increase administrative
costs, and create excessive delays in the Fund’s operation.
Fourth, some solution will have to be provided for cases in which countries propose too
many conditions when making submissions – perhaps in order to signal to the market an
exaggerated willingness to launch reform. The IEO has warned against programs ‘overpromising’ on a range of structural reforms and the time frame for their implementation,
especially when such reforms have no serious political backing. Such over-promising has
weakened the credibility of Fund programs because it inevitably leads to an impression of poor
implementation and poor program design.95 As recognized in the Guidelines on Conditionality,
conditions should be limited to those critical to achieving the aims of Fund programs. A
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plausible solution is that the Fund will indicate which conditions, out of those proposed by the
country, will be regarded as critical and binding and which policies are not to be part of the
program. The Fund will monitor only the former.
Fifth, a country whose submission has been rejected by the Fund will not be able to make a
revised submission immediately following the Fund’s decision. Otherwise, knowing they can
always re-submit an application, countries will have an incentive to commit to minimal
conditions in the hope that the Fund might accept them. A time-frame will have to be
determined, following which re-submission would be possible. On the other hand, if the program
requires only minor modifications, it may be returned to the country with comments for resubmission within a short period.
Finally, as pointed out by Bhagwati, economic programs almost always suffer from
uncertainty or face unanticipated problems.96 Accordingly, even when the Fund approves a
country’s submission, the Fund – with the country’s cooperation – should formulate contingency
plans in accordance with risks identified prior to program implementation.97 Such contingency
plans will be kept confidential, but will be used once the initial policies fail or require
modification.

IV.

Potential Problems with the Proposal, Replies and Suggested Solutions:

The proposal for self-imposed conditionality is admittedly imperfect. In the following
discussions I deal with potential problems with the proposal. Each sub-section raises a potential
problem, followed by a discussion of the problem. Some of these problems are relevant
exclusively to this proposal, whereas others may be equally relevant to the current practice of
conditionality.
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A. Those Who Created the Problem Should Not Be the Ones Entrusted with
Solving it

A legitimate criticism of the proposal may be that the government that put a country in a difficult
financial position should not be in charge of designing the policies for economic recovery. On
this view, member countries should be subjected to the Fund’s conditions partly because they
have manifested irresponsible economic policy-making. Such a view is misguided for several
reasons.
First, it may be that the government whose actions contributed to the creation of large debts
has been replaced, or that the current government has made only little contribution to enlarging
the national debt. Second, the government itself may not bear the prime responsibility for the
difficult economic situation. In a global world, countries, especially small ones, may be affected
by various changes in financial markets with very limited means of mitigating the effects of
these changes. Contagions, the spread of market dislocation from one country to the next, were
frequently the main cause of crises in the 1990s.
Third, the idea of a defaulter that is given the latitude to recover from distress or from failure
to perform its legal obligations has been recognized in other legal frameworks, such as Chapter
11 and Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The main feature of Chapter 11 is that the debtor
remains in control of its assets. In the case of corporations-debtors, the old directors and officers,
known collectively as the ‘debtor in possession,’ normally remain in their positions.98 They
continue to run the business and enjoy almost all the rights of the trustee, including the right to
sell and lease property and the right to borrow money.99 Chapter 9, which deals with
bankruptcies of municipalities, is even more deferential to debtors. The debtor-municipality
remains in charge of the city’s affairs, including its financial matters, and the bankruptcy court
98
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cannot interfere with any of the debtor’s political or governmental powers, any of the debtor’s
property or revenues, or the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property, unless
the debtor consents or the plan so provides.100
Fourth, the Fund expressly acknowledges the importance of member countries retaining
ownership of the substance of conditions. This is most prominently reflected in the Guidelines on
Conditionality. As discussed above, the Guidelines expressly state that the domestic government
should be in charge of selecting and designing the conditions, as well as drafting the letter of
intent.101 Given that the Fund itself assumes a leading role for the defaulting government, the
proposal effectively assures that the Fund will follow what it currently claims to be its own
policy.102
Fifth, the Fund and the World Bank have already initiated a formal program for inducing
member countries to improve their own policy-making, namely the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF). Under PRGF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared
by member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as
external development partners, such as the Fund and the World Bank. PRSPs describe the
country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three-year or longer
horizon to promote growth and reduce poverty. The country’s documents, accompanied by
assessments made by the joint staff of the Fund and the World Bank, are published on a
website.103 These nationally-owned PRSPs provide the basis of all World Bank and Fund
concessional lending and for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
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(HIPC) Initiative. Countries are expected to commit to reducing poverty in accordance with their
own economic policies as a condition for receiving debt relief.
Experience with the SPRPs has been mixed, with some success. With regard to ownership,
concerns have been raised that countries are forced to propose the same policies that the Fund
would otherwise impose.104 The IEO’s recent report suggests that there has been considerable
widening of the policy space afforded to member countries, although the Fund continues to be
overtly prescriptive in several areas and the level of ownership varies across countries.105 In
addition, some of the IEO’s recommendations support the key elements of self-imposed
conditionality. Apart from the need to further enhance ownership and afford more policy space
to countries, the IEO recommends, inter alia, that both countries’ and Fund policies should be
subject to more public scrutiny, that the Fund joint assessments with the World Bank of
countries’ PRSPs should be more principled and refer to specific criteria, and that the rationale
and reasons for IMF policies should be more clearly stated in program documents.
Finally, even under my proposal the Fund retains the power to invoke its intrusive powers.
The exercise of such powers may be necessary in certain circumstances, especially when a
country consistently fails to implement conditions in loan agreements or insists on pursuing
policies that are likely to lead to financial crisis. In such cases, giving a sovereign country an
opportunity to rectify the situation itself before the Fund actively intervenes will legitimize the
Fund’s involvement in that country’s internal affairs.

B. Countries May Not Have the Power and Resources to Make Submissions
to the IMF
Some countries have very limited means and resources, to the extent that they would be unable
to make their own detailed submissions to the Fund. In some countries there is a scarcity of the
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most basic resources. However, several arguments should be raised in this context. First, the
proposal provides for countries to waive their right to make submissions and accept the Fund’s
jurisdiction. Following a waiver, the Fund would act on a footing similar to the current system.
Second, the Fund is able to grant technical assistance to member countries. Moreover, the
possibility of maintaining a pool of economists that advise member countries can also mitigate
this problem. Finally, a good argument can also be made that Fund conditionality is not the
appropriate mechanism to deal with truly impoverished countries that require overall
restructuring of their economies rather than temporary loans. World Bank conditionality or the
PRGF discussed above are more suitable mechanisms for this purpose. Thus the proposal is more
relevant to countries that generally have sufficient resources to run their own affairs.
It may be noted that the more detailed and complex the submissions that countries have to
make when applying to the Fund, the more difficult it will be for countries to comply with the
requirements. Again, the interest in both countries’ ownership and responsible policy-making
should be considered. The objective is to design procedural requirements, which are not too
burdensome to prevent governments from making submissions to the Fund, but yet require of
them a reasonable measure of commitment and seriousness in making these submissions.

C. The Fund Can Still Impose its Own Views on Developing Countries
It may be argued that the Fund might take an overtly restrictive view of the range of
reasonableness and strike down too easily conditions proposed by member countries. The
standard of reasonableness is very flexible, and domestic jurisprudence shows that it may be
applied with varying degrees of intensity.
There are several replies to this argument. First, there is no better alternative. A standard of
reasonableness creates a better balance between sovereignty and responsible lending than the
current practice, under which the actual level of ownership is somewhat arbitrary and affected by
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extraneous considerations. The reasonableness standard recognizes the right of countries to
continue making their policies, but also the fact that strongly owned policies may be misguided,
in which case the Fund should insist on internal reform while explaining the reasons for its
position.106
Second, the risk of unduly restrictive application of the reasonableness standard is mitigated
by several factors. The country has a right of first proposal in designing the content of Fund
programs. The Fund will have to refer to the terms proposed by the country, and if it decides not
to accept the proposal, it must provide the reasons for its decision.107 These reasons will be
published and presumably scrutinized by reference to this standard. The emergence and growth
of precedents and standards will add certainty to the application of reasonableness. Accordingly,
it will be difficult for the Fund – or at least, more difficult than under the present system – to use
reasonableness in order to supplant the judgment of domestic authorities.108
Third, the Fund does care about its public image. Recent criticisms of its policies have led the
Fund to consider various changes concerning its relationship with developing countries.109 If the
Fund is to have a legal obligation to explain its decisions publicly, this may well be a sufficient
incentive for the Fund to exercise its judgment fairly and consistently. The costs of being
regarded as ‘unjust’ toward developing countries are high and borne not only by the Fund but
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also by its major shareholders. Without good reasons, it will be very difficult for the Fund to
disapprove reasonable submissions.
Alternatively, as suggested above, it is possible to consider having a review mechanism of
the Fund’s decision by an advisory committee. This may be necessary if public censure is not a
sufficient incentive for the Fund to exercise its power fairly and consistently. But again, the
major downside is that the procedure may become too legalized and cumbersome.

D. The IMF Has to Work Fast – the Costs of a Prolonged Procedure
In many instances, the Fund has to make decisions in no more than several weeks, or even days.
For example, in the case of the economic crisis in Argentina that erupted in 2001, the country
was in need of immediate funds. Countries may have no time to make detailed submissions to
the Fund.
There are several replies to this argument. First, in most circumstances member countries do
have sufficient time to make submissions to the Fund. The average time in which countries
negotiate with the Fund over the terms of loans is approximately one month, and in many
instances negotiations may take even longer. By contrast to the previous example, in other
instances Argentina negotiated loans with the Fund over a period of several months without any
major new crisis emerging during that time.110
Second, the procedure can be carried out relatively promptly. Well-crafted policies can be
prepared quickly, especially if the application procedure is regularized, studied and practiced for
some time.111 It is also likely that countries that are frequently in need of Fund assistance will
assign specific officers with the responsibility of making applications to the Fund when
necessary; presumably, these will be officers that already work vis-à-vis the Fund regarding
110
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other issues, such as surveillance.112 The review procedure, with the help of guidelines,
precedents and organized coordination with member countries, can be conducted relatively
quickly. Although it does not normally operate in emergency circumstances, the experience of
the OMB shows that review of complex regulation can be conducted in a relatively short time.113
Third, certain solutions may be designed to deal with emergency cases. For example, if the
procedure and formalities for applying to the Fund are not specified in advance, the Fund may
relax them in emergency cases. As suggested above, the Fund may then take the sufficiency of
the procedure followed (i.e., the reasons, facts and consultations on which the submission is
based) into account when considering the reasonableness of the proposed conditions. On this
view, a short, laconic submission may be reasonable in circumstances of extreme emergency.
Alternatively, the procedure can provide for the applicant to ask for immediate financial
assistance in return for a commitment to come up with a proposal for reform by some deadline. If
necessary, the Fund could state its own conditionality immediately, as it does now, but with the
understanding that this would be the default should the applicant’s proposal be adjudged
unreasonable.114 The applicant would still have the option of accepting the Fund’s default
conditions.115 Finally, countries may still waive their right of first proposal if they prefer the
Fund to step in immediately.116
Fourth, a bad policy imposed quickly is worse than a good policy delayed for some time.
This clearly holds true in cases where the conditions imposed by the Fund have aggravated the
economic situation of the borrower country. It is also valid in cases where the member country is
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reluctant to implement conditions imposed by the Fund. In such cases, effective implementation
is unlikely, the chances for economic recovery are low and the potential for strife between the
country and Fund officials is high. Therefore, the costs of some delay, if any, are likely to be less
than the benefits of creating a system that produces more effective policy-making in developing
countries.
Some undue delay, however, may occur when countries make proposals that are clearly
inadequate. Moreover, governments may manipulate the process and make sham proposals to the
Fund. This may occur either because the government wants to be perceived as resisting
intervention by the Fund,117 or because it is simply acting recklessly. To provide for such
situations, it may be useful for the Fund to have some limited power to deny a country the right
to design self-imposed conditions. Such power, if adopted, should be used sparingly in extreme
situations where reform must be carried out to bring about financial stability, and where the
government is clearly incapable of initiating it.118

E. The Administrative Costs are too High
It may be argued that the administrative costs involved in this new procedure, especially the
costs of making submissions and explaining decisions may be excessive.
As regards the costs to the Fund, it is submitted that they will not necessarily be higher than
under the present system. The Fund will have to bear the additional costs of publishing its
decisions and the reasons for them. But if member countries will do most of the work of
designing and formulating loan conditions, the Fund can save the costs of preparing and fiercely
negotiating arrangements.119 Even in cases where the Fund disapproves a proposal, its costs in
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preparing the conditions may be reduced to the extent that it has already examined the economic
situation of the relevant country and acquired relevant information.
As regards the applying country, it may be more costly to prepare an economic policy rather
than have the Fund prepare it. Nonetheless, the benefits of being able to design the policy
independently, whether they derive from non-interference with the country’s sovereignty or from
more effective policies, are likely to outweigh these administrative costs. Moreover, as noted
above, it is plausible that countries will take the opportunity to establish mechanisms to deal with
the Fund rapidly and efficiently, for example, by training officers to prepare the required
submissions and specialize in matters of concern to the Fund. In any case, countries can always
choose to waive their right to make submissions to the Fund; but if they choose to make the
submissions, this would be the best indication that the benefits of designing conditions outweigh
the costs of doing so.

F. Other Countries and Private Banks Will Not Assist the Fund in making Loans
Additional co-operation and the provision of further funds by other countries and private banks
have in many cases been essential to complement the Fund’s assistance. One notable example is
the United States’ $20 billion aid package to Mexico in 1995.120 It could be argued that countries
and private banks may not be willing to cooperate with the Fund if country borrowers are given a
right to impose conditions on themselves. However, if the quality of conditions increases and
countries have a better chance of recovery, there is no reason why other parties should be
reluctant to continue to play the same role and lend similar assistance, as they do under the
current system. In fact, there are strong indications that private actors increasingly act
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independently of the Fund and tend to make their own judgments as to the merits and probability
of success of countries’ policies, even in the face of disapproval by the Fund.121

G. Confidentiality Versus Transparency
Enhanced transparency is a key element of the proposal set out in this paper. Some may argue
that confidentiality and informality are essential to the Fund’s operations. This argument may
largely be divided into four claims. I will take each of these claims in turn.
Confidentiality and informality are sometimes seen as essential to enable governments to
agree to accept conditions they would otherwise be incapable to adopt because of internal
opposition. Several counter-arguments can be made. First, the fact that confidentiality has
facilitated formal acceptance of certain conditions by governments does not necessarily mean
that these conditions were desirable or complied with. As shown above, conditionality has often
been ineffective, and without sufficient ownership, including sufficient political and social
support, compliance with conditions is unlikely. Second, under the current system not only
hasn’t agreement been secured between the Fund and developing countries, but strife has
actually reached new heights. In addition, in some instances, confidentiality enabled the Fund to
put pressure on governments to accept policies that they were not willing to accept.122 Third,
under this proposal, a decision to seek Fund assistance is likely to attract less internal political
opposition because the Fund’s power over governments is limited. The government continues to
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Jamaica’s experience, as depicted in IEO (2002), above footnote 28, strongly supports this point. In 1996 Jamaica
decided not to seek further Fund assistance because of disagreements with the Fund over its economic policies.
Nonetheless, Jamaica was able to maintain access to private markets on relatively good terms. It is also remarkable
that Jamaican officials published IMF surveillance reports even when they did not fully share the Fund’s views and
explained the reasons for their different approach.
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Under self-imposed conditionality, a potential strife between the Fund and a member country may occur if both
sides cling to their views and the Fund formally disapproves a country’s submission. Such a scenario is only
expected to occur when both sides are truly persuaded of their position, and when the costs of entering into a direct
dispute are lower than the costs of accepting the other side’s position. Because a greater public debate will no doubt
follow, a major cost of entering into dispute is the cost of losing in such a debate. These costs will be particularly
high because each party’s position is published and scrutinized. Accordingly, each party will normally challenge the
other publicly only if it has good reasons for its position. It is submitted that in such cases, where there is a genuine
disagreement between the Fund and a country, greater public debate will help achieve better results and more
effective ex post study.
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make its own policies subject to specified grounds of review, and the Fund’s intervention has to
be thoroughly explained.123 Fourth, economic recovery has been more effective where countries
pursued economic reform openly and publicly. For example, the recovery of the Korean
economy in the late 1990s was partly due to the openness of the government commitment to
economic reform and cooperation with the Fund.
A second possible claim is that publication of certain facts about the applying country may in
some circumstances injure the economic outlook for that country. Although this may be true,
especially in the short run, concealing information may be even more costly. The IEO, for
example, recommends that the Fund should be able to disclose information, including
unfavorable information, about misguided domestic policies and express its views regarding the
need for critical reforms:‘…relevant information should be disclosed even if it may cause
negative shifts in market sentiment because, in the long run, the IMF cannot expect to be
effective if it is perceived as willing to go along with hiding information from the markets.’124
The Fund’s endorsement of domestic policies does not by itself restore confidence without
sufficient justification of the rationale of the program and disclosure of all relevant
information.125 As discussed above, transparency and communication of the rationale of program
design are highly important for building the credibility of Fund programs.
The third and fourth claims also concern the publicity of the procedure. If the Fund publishes
its disapproval of a state’s proposal, various counter reactions may become disruptive to the
continuance of the lending process and various groups may seek to challenge or influence the
123

An internal debate on the content of submissions will no doubt take place, but such a debate can be conducive to
achieving broader domestic support for policies and strengthening ownership.
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IEO (2003a), above footnote 28, at 44 [my emphasis]; at 53, the IEO expressly recommends early publication of
‘any unfavorable information’. Also see IEO (2004), above footnote 27, at 71:‘An important lesson of the Argentine
experience is that strong ownership should not deter the IMF from forcefully making its views known. The IMF
should be prepared not to support a strongly owned program, if it is judged inadequate in generating a desired
outcome, but should be prepared to explain the rationale and evidence behind such decisions.’ [My emphasis]
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See discussion above, especially footnote 121. Also see IEO (2004), above footnote 27. The latter report says that
market actors were puzzled by the Fund’s actions in the Argentinean crises and that the Fund’s endorsement of bad
domestic policies did not help restore the confidence of commercial banks, which were well aware that problems
continued to persist.
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Fund’s operation. In addition, publicity can discourage countries from revealing information to
the Fund and making submissions.126 These concerns over publicity can be resolved by
modifying the publication requirement. Publication of submissions or of the Fund’s reasons for
its decisions need not occur in the midst of the process of application and negotiations. There are
two main options. First, the Fund may publish the reasons for its decision, including all relevant
documents, after a certain period of time following the conclusion of the loan agreement.
Accordingly, the information will no longer have any effect on the lending process or on the
economy of the country. Second, it may be possible to leave the publication to the discretion of
the country. The Fund will deliver its reasons to the member country, and the country will
consider whether it wishes to publish the information.
The second option has the advantage of being able to protect a country from disclosure of
information that may be sensitive to its economy. But this is not a compelling advantage. Under
the first option, the country hardly needs protection because the information published will have
already become stale. More fundamentally, the first option is preferable because of the benefits
of ex post review and mutual study. It ensures that countries can learn from the experience of
other countries. Programs, policies and the Fund’s review can be deliberated, criticized and
improved – for the benefit of all countries.
It should be emphasized, however, that these two options have one significant drawback.
Under both options there would be less scope for timely criticism of the Fund’s decisions and
discussion of alternative choices. The country which is directly affected by the Fund’s decision
may not be able to influence the Fund to agree to its position through public and academic
pressure. Again, there is no need to make a conclusive determination for the present purposes as
regards which option is preferable. The point is that there should be a balance between the
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Although note that, as discussed above, countries will also have an incentive to disclose information to the extent
that this will allow them to get financial assistance on the basis of owned policies. In addition, it should be added
that published reasons should be limited to those necessary to explain a decision and must not extend to general and
irrelevant information on a country’s economic situation.
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benefits of timely criticism as against the potentially (and arguably) harmful effect of publicity
on the lending procedure and the economy of the applying country.

V.

Legalization, Formalization and the Role of the IMF

Legalization has been broadly defined by reference to three dimensions: obligation, precision
and delegation.127 At present the degree of legalization of the Fund’s activities is regarded as
relatively low,128 although this may be less accurate when considering conditionality apart from
other Fund activities.129 In any case, if the proposal for self-imposed conditionality is adopted,
the procedure for applying to the Fund and its operation will be substantially legalized and
formalized. Instead of having a relatively informal procedure whereby the Fund negotiates
arrangements with member countries, the Fund and member countries will have to follow a
regularized procedure and act within specifically defined powers.
As pointed out by Kahler, it is impossible to specify in generalized terms the consequences of
legalization and formalization.130 Although legalization may lead to improved compliance of
member countries and increased credibility and legitimacy of international institutions, it may
also create various costs, such as administrative costs, sovereignty costs, etc. The consequences
of legalization depend on its substance and on the institution in question.
I argue above that in the context of the Fund’s operation legalization will provide various
benefits to the Fund and its client member countries. Legalization will grant legitimacy to the
Fund’s power to intervene in countries’ internal affairs, increase transparency and accountability
127

Kenneth O. W. Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, ‘The
Concept of Legalization’, International Organization, Vol. 54, Issue 3 (June 2000), 401. Obligation means that states
or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or a set of rules or commitments. Precision means that rules
unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize and prescribe. Delegation means that third parties have
been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules.
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Ibid.. The Fund has a low level of obligation and precision, but a high to moderate level of delegation.
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The Fund has various tasks including surveillance and consultation. Conditionality probably has a higher degree
of obligation and precision than the Fund’s other activities. Once included in loan agreements, conditions are fairly
precise and binding on member countries.
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Miles Kahler, ‘Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization’, International Organization, Vol. 54,
Issue 3 (June 2000), 661.
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of the Fund’s decision-making process, and enhance the participation of developing countries. In
addition, legalization is likely to improve compliance with conditions, not only because of
increased ownership, but also because it strengthens countries’ commitment to abide by their
obligations pursuant to these conditions.131 Within the developing countries, legalization can also
lead to specialization because governments will have incentives to train people to engage with
the Fund.
Legalization may also lead to a change in the Fund’s function. Instead of trying to tell
countries in financial distress what to do, it will assume a role as educator of developing
countries. The manner in which the Fund will apply its review powers over conditions proposed
by member countries will signal to member countries the Fund’s understandings of the limits of
reasonable economic policy-making.
The Fund can further assume the role of educator by continuing to make its information
resources available to all member countries, especially those applying to it. The Fund will retain
a record of all case-studies and precedents that the new procedure will generate. These cases may
in fact lead to a convergence of economic ideas and economic thought. Likewise, they can
increase our understanding of the effectiveness of alternative policies in similar situations. The
Fund thus will keep information on potential economic solutions and regulatory structures.132
Member countries, especially developing countries, will be able to use these resources to study
the experiences of other countries and choose the economic and regulatory frameworks that fit
their political and social needs.
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Beth A. Simmons, ‘The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs’, International Organization, Vol. 54,
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Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that the costs of legalization and formalization will
not be substantial. The main costs of legalization, as pointed out by Kahler, are sovereignty costs
and the costs of inflexibility of policy-making.133 As to the former, my proposal accords more
respect to the sovereignty of member countries than the current system. As to the latter, the
proposal is inherently flexible because it does not prescribe predetermined solutions or
obligations. In fact, it is more flexible than the current system because it is designed to give
effect to a wider range of ideas and policies. Finally, the potential costs of delay and
administrative costs have been discussed above.

VI.

Conclusion

The proposal for self-imposed conditionality has many benefits. It is likely to lead to increased
participation, transparency and accountability, better compliance with loan conditions, more
respect for sovereignty, and less strife between the Fund and developing countries. The Fund can
assume a role as educator of developing countries, which in turn will have greater incentive to
improve their economic policy-making. The procedure for self-imposition of conditions and the
Fund’s review of proposed conditions are likely to induce mutual study of the international
financial system through a deliberative process. Most importantly, the procedure is likely to
generate better economic programs for economic recovery, recognizing that in some instances
domestic officials know best, whereas in other instances intervention by external professionals is
required.
The main difficulty with the proposal may be its implementation. Developed countries and
the Fund may be reluctant to cede control over the lending mechanism. This is unjustified,
because the proposal contemplates that the Fund will retain the power to strike down
unreasonable conditions. Developing countries may resist legalization because of the
transparency element and because it makes non-compliance with conditions more difficult. In
133

Kahler, above footnote 130, at 664-665.

53

addition, as I discuss above, concerns over issues, such as, the costs of resources, delay in
program design and the publicity of the procedure need to be addressed. Perhaps the move
towards self-imposition of conditions should be accomplished gradually and with some
experimentation before changing the current system.
I also note that there are several issues that merit consideration but are not discussed in this
paper. One example is the question of which instrument is best suited to accommodate the
proposed procedure: an amendment to the Articles of Agreement, a Board resolution, or internal
guidelines. Another important issue concerns the question of who within the Fund will be
responsible for making decisions on the reasonableness of country’s submissions and for
providing the reasons for such decisions: the Fund’s management, the Executive Board, or
both.134 Consultations with civil society should also be duly incorporated into the procedure,
although not necessarily via formal arrangements.
Finally, it is also worth noting that this proposal is not incompatible with other reform
proposals that concern financial crises of developing countries, the international bankruptcy
procedure in particular. International bankruptcy assumes that the Fund will continue to lend to
member countries.135 Accordingly, reform of the lending procedure and conditionality is
necessary irrespective of other reform initiatives.
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